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Abstract
This paper first gives a briefing on the background, organisation and functioning of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). We then give some background on
climate change in the past before considering what IPCC says about likely future impact of
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases.
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1 Introduction
In its Second Assessment Report (SAR) from 1995 the IPCC concluded that
Although carefully worded the statement has created a rather heated debate, also among
climate scientist. Some well-known and respected scientists disagree that we at this moment
in time are able to discern a human influence on the global climate. Also in connection with
the production of the last Assessment report, some procedural errors were introduced in the
final editing of the chapters of the report. These errors were then used by interest groups
opposed to climate change policy to discredit the whole report and the organisation producing
the report - IPCC.
On this background it is understandable that some have come to see IPCC and its reports as
mainly political manifestations, to be discussed within the political arena on par with other
political topics such as the ‘right’ fiscal policy, etc. Thus, a basic misconception of IPCC as a
political body has been spreading.
In this presentation we will first of all try to convey what IPCC is and what it is not. Then we
will come back to a discussion of the above statement on the likely human impact on climate
change and briefly relate it to natural climate change in the past. In closing, we will finally
say a few words on the nature of the problem of climate change.
«The balance of evidence, from changes in global mean surface air temperature and from
changes in geographical, seasonal and vertical patterns of atmospheric temperature,
suggests a discernible human influence on global climate. There are uncertainties in key
factors, including the magnitude and patterns of long-term natural variability.»
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2 IPCC: The background, organisation and
procedures
2.1 Background: The history of the climate problem
Scientific recognition of the potential of human activity to modify climate dates back at least
to the early nineteenth century. Thus, in 1827, Baron Jean-Baptiste Fourier suggested that
human activity can modify surface climate, and he was perhaps one of the first to suggest the
now well known greenhouse effect of the atmosphere (Fourier, 1827, Ramanathan, 1988).
The greenhouse theory of climate change was, however, only taken up in earnest later in the
last century when in 1896 the Swedish scientist Svante Arrhenius published his first estimate
of a man-made global temperature change caused by man-made emissions (Arrhenius, 1896,
Rodhe et. al., 1997). His main insight was that burning of fossil fuels and the release of CO2
could affect the
escape of heat from
the Earth.
The next milestone
can perhaps be said
to relate to research
carried out by Roger
Revelle and Hans
Suess at the Scripps
Institute of Oceano-
graphy in the 1950s.
Their research indi-
cated that the oceans
only seem to absorb
about half of the
manmade CO2
emissions.
This research led in
turn to the
establishment of a
monitoring net-
work under the guidance of Charles Keeling from the same institute. This monitoring firmly
established that the CO2 concentration in our atmosphere is increasing and is now far above
the level believed to have existed in pre-industrial times (280 ppmv), see figure 1.
Scientific interest in man’s potential impact on global climate was stirred by the research and
monitoring initiated in the 1950’s, and this interest was further mobilised through confer-
ences, loose research networks and assessments especially from the 1970’s onwards
(Agrawala, 1998).
Figure 1: Measurement of CO2 concentration at Mouna
Loa, Hawaii
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The starting point for the recent international efforts to better understand climate variations
and the possible problem of a human-induced climate change is generally regarded to be the
UN Conference on Human Development in Stockholm in 1972. At this conference results
from a numerical climate model predicting climate development into the next century were
presented. Further refinement of this type of model, together with a report from the
University of East Anglia highlighting that the 1980s contained several of the warmest years
in the historical record (see figure 2), created widespread concern about climate change as a
man-made global environmental problem.
In 1979 the World Climate Conference was held in Geneva, and the World Climate Pro-
gramme (WCP) was launched. The creation of the WCP set forth a series of workshops held
in Villach, Austria, in 1980, 1983 and 1985 and organised under the auspices of the World
Meteorological Organization (WMO), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
and the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) (Agrawala, 1998). At the 1985
Villach meeting an international group of scientists reached a consensus that, as a result of
the increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, a rise in the global
mean temperature “greater than any in man’s history” could occur in the first half of the next
century. This group of experts also stated that “… the understanding of the greenhouse
question is sufficiently developed that scientists and policy-makers should begin active
collaboration to explore the effectiveness of alternative policies and adjustments” (WMO,
1985).
In combination with a set of other factors, especially anomalous weather conditions in Europe
and America, the 1985 Villach meeting was instrumental in bringing the climate issue onto
the international political agenda. In 1986 the Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases
(AGGG) was set up under the joint sponsorship of WMO, UNEP and ICSU. Each of these
bodies nominated two experts, and the panel consisted of six members: Gordon Goodman,
Bert Bolin, Ken Hare, G. Golitsyn, Sukiyoro Manabe and M. Kassas (Agrawala, 1998).
Annual mean temperature anomalies relative to 1951-1980
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
1865 1875 1885 1895 1905 1915 1925 1935 1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995
0.
01
 d
eg
re
e 
C
el
si
us
Annual global mean
Northern hem., 12 years running average
Southern hem., 12 years running average
Global, 12 years running average
Sources:
 NCAR 1752/1988 MCDW-12/1997 NOAA-11/1997
Figure 2: Annual mean temperature anomalies relative to 1951-1980
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During the latter half of the 1980’s the climate issue increasingly gained saliency among the
public, scientists and policy-makers, not least through the work of the so-called Brundtland
Commission (WCED, 1987). At the Toronto Conference of the Atmosphere, where more
than 300 scientists and policy-makers from 48 countries, UN organisations, IGOs and NGOs
participated, an explicit policy recommendation calling upon national governments to reduce
CO2 emissions by 20% from 1988 levels by 2005 was agreed upon.
Meanwhile, the WMO and UNEP in close co-operation with various US agencies agreed that
an intergovernmental mechanism was needed to undertake further internationally co-
ordinated scientific assessments of climate change, and invitations to governments to the first
session of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) were sent out early 1988.
The first plenary session of the IPCC took place in November 1988. The AGGG set up in
1986 was gradually replaced by the IPCC and has not met since 1990.
2.2 The function and products of the IPCC
The main purpose of the IPCC is to provide assessment reports of state-of-the-art knowledge
on climate change. The objective of the IPCC, as formulated by the governing bodies of
WMO and UNEP, is twofold:
Figure 3: IPCC organisation
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i) To assess the scientific information related to the various components of the climate
change issue and the information needed to evaluate the environmental and socio-eco-
nomic consequences of climate change, and
ii) To formulate “realistic response strategies for the management of the climate change
issue” (Report of the first session of the IPCC).
In 1988, three Working Groups (WGs) were set up to attain this objective:
· Working Group I (WGI) was assigned the task of assessing available scientific informa-
tion on climate change,
· Working Group II (WGII) was assigned the task of assessing environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change, and
· Working Group III (WGIII) was assigned the task of formulating response strategies.
In 1992, the IPCC structure was slightly changed: Working Groups II and III were merged in
the old Working Group II, while a new Working Group III was set up to deal with socio-
economic and other cross-cutting issues related to climate change.
IPCC has as one of its main tasks to assess “scientific information”. All working groups
conduct assessments on the basis of published literature within relevant fields and disciplines.
Thus, IPCC does not carry out scientific research. Furthermore, the term “scientific
information” is generally taken to mean that only published and peer reviewed scientific
material is taken into account.
In connection with the planned Third Assessment Report (TAR), a slight readjustment of the
mandate for the three working groups has been suggested as follows:
IPCC reports
· Assessment Reports: The full scientific assessment with status as “Reports accepted by
WGs”. Accepted by WG plenary, but not subject to discussion.
· Executive summaries and Summaries for Policy-makers: Summaries of the full
scientific assessment with status as “Reports approved by WGs and accepted by the
Panel”. Subject to line-by-line approval by WG plenary. Accepted by full panel
plenary, and not subject to discussion at this decision-making level.
· Synthesis Reports: Synthesis of the reports of all WGs, developed by the WG
leadership in co-operation with lead authors and specially invited experts with status as
“Reports approved by the Panel”. Subject to line-by-line approval by full panel plenary.
· Special Reports: Assessments on special issues. Subject to the review, acceptance and
approval procedures of the assessment reports in general.
· Technical Papers (since 1995): Reports on specific issues, based on existing as-
sessment reports, not submitted to the acceptance and approval procedures of the
assessment reports.
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· Working Group I will assess the scientific aspects of the climate system and climate
change (as before);
· Working Group II will assess the scientific, technical, environmental, economic and
social aspects of the vulnerability (sensitivity and adaptability) to climate change of, and
the negative and positive consequences (impacts) for, ecological systems, socio-
economic sectors and human health, with an emphasis on regional sectoral and cross-
sectoral issues;
· Working Group III will assess the scientific, technical, environmental, economic and
social aspects of the mitigation of climate change, and through a task group (multi-
disciplinary team), will assess the methodological aspects of cross-cutting issues (e.g.,
equity, discount rates and decision making frameworks).
While the main products of IPCC are the assessment reports, other types of reports are also
produced (see text box). The First IPCC Assessment Report was presented to the Second
World Climate Conference in 1990, where it was accepted as an adequate basis upon which
to start climate negotiations. In December 1995, the IPCC Plenary accepted the Second IPCC
Assessment Report. Work on a Third Assessment Report (TAR) is underway (current work
plans suggest finalisation in 2001).
2.3 The Assessment Process
The IPCC is organised in three
decision-making levels that serve
different functions in the assessment
process: the “scientific core”, the
WG plenaries, and the full panel
(IPCC) plenary at the top of the
institution, see figure 4.
At WG and panel plenaries, all UN
members and members of the IPCC’s
two sponsoring organisations, the
WMO and UNEP, can participate.
Participation at these levels is in prin-
ciple open. Governmental authorities
nominate all members of national
delegations.
At the start of an assessment
process, the leaders of each WG
develops a work-plan for the
assessment, which is subsequently
approved by the plenary of the WG and accepted by the full panel plenary. Governments
nominate teams of lead- and contributing authors. The bureau (chair and vice-chairs) of each
WG selects lead authors from the nomination lists provided by governments. Contributing
Figure 4: The different levels of the IPCC
process
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authors may also be specially invited; however, with due consideration of the geographic
balance of the groups, particularly with regard to ensuring participation by scientists from
developing countries. Lead authors participate in their personal capacities.
The assessment reports are developed in the scientific core of the IPCC, in a series of meet-
ings in task forces and sub-groups established for particular issues, workshops and confer-
ences, and most importantly, in regular lead- and contributing author meetings. The summa-
ries to the assessments – the summary for policy-makers and the executive summary – are
also developed at this level. Scientists active in research dominate participation in the scien-
tific core.
When a draft report has been developed, it is submitted to an extensive, two-phased review
procedure, including both expert and government review. According to the rules of procedure
of the IPCC, lead authors, WG chairs, sub-group chairs and vice-chairs are responsible for
incorporating comments from the review “as appropriate”. In this regard, lead authors, chairs
and vice-chairs are encouraged to arrange wider meetings with principal contributors and re-
viewers to discuss particular aspects or areas of major differences, as deemed necessary and
if time and funding permits. It is also emphasised in the rules of procedure that the
assessment reports “describe different (possibly controversial) scientific or technical views on
a subject, particularly if they are relevant to the political debate”.
The revised draft of the assessment and its summaries are then submitted to the WG plenary
for acceptance and approval. At this level, the discussion takes on quite a different character.
While the full scientific assessment report is accepted by the plenary en bloc and usually
without further discussion, the summaries – the Executive Summary (ES) and the Summary
for Policy-makers (SPM) – undergo a detailed and time consuming revision where the for-
mulations of the documents are discussed and negotiated line-by-line.
The main bulk of participants to WG plenaries are national delegations, comprising govern-
ment officials, low-level policy-makers and/or scientists with governmental affiliations.
National governments to a varying extent send independent scientists as members of national
delegations to WG plenary meetings.
Mainly representatives of the teams of lead authors represent scientists at this decision-
making level. Lead authors have acquired a special status as authorities in the debate, and
substantive changes to the text of the summaries are not made without consent from the lead
authors of the chapter in question. Thus, while government officials at this level may out-
number scientists, the scientists still have a significant amount of “control” over the docu-
ments.
The WG plenary discussions represent the first step towards acquiring a political acceptance
of the knowledge base developed in the scientific core and its substantive conclusions. Hav-
ing undergone this thorough and detailed treatment, where alternative formulations and inter-
pretations of the corresponding formulations in the bulk report have been discussed and
negotiated, the substantive conclusions of the knowledge base are in a sense “tried out” and
“digested” by policy-makers. Having survived this intense scientific and political scrutiny
with their scientific credibility and authority intact, the substantive conclusions come out as
more robust.
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The accepted and approved assessment report and summaries are then submitted to the full
panel plenary for acceptance. The full panel plenary cannot, however, amend a report that has
been accepted or approved by the WG plenary. This institutional device is important for
ensuring consistency between the summaries and the assessment report upon which the sum-
maries are based.
At the WG plenary, lead authors’ scientific authority is used as a vehicle for ensuring this
consistency and also to prevent scientifically unsubstantiated formulations from entering the
summaries. While lead authors usually participate at the WG plenary level, they seldom
participate in the full panel plenary meetings. The inability of the full panel plenary to amend
text that has been approved by the WG plenaries also prevents the reopening in the full panel
plenary of controversial issues already settled in the WG plenaries.
Thus, while the assessment process is formally finalised with the acceptance of the assess-
ments and summaries by the panel plenary, it is in practice finalised with the acceptance and
approval of the reports by the WG plenary (according to the 1993 rules of procedure).
The panel plenary also approves the Synthesis Report drafted by the leadership of each of the
three WGs in co-operation with a specially invited group of scientists, lead authors and ex-
perts. The 1995 Synthesis Report was developed and discussed at several conferences with
broad participation. The procedure by which consensus on the Synthesis Report is developed
in the panel plenary is, in form, similar to the negotiations taking place in WG plenary meet-
ings. A notable exception is the near absence of scientists at this decision-making level. This
place a special burden and challenge on the members of the drafting team who are present
and the scientific leadership of the WGs and the panel.
2.4 Decision Rules and Recruitment Procedures
The IPCC has been criticised for forging a scientific consensus in an area characterised by
scientific uncertainty and controversy. The scientific core of the IPCC, in which the assess-
ments are developed, does not, however, operate under a consensus rule. On the contrary, a
fair representation of the scientific debate is regarded as a main objective.
The development of an assessment which reflects the scientific debate with its inherent
uncertainties and controversies and which, thus, is acceptable to all parties in the debate is
considered an important objective of the IPCC process. In this regard, therefore, the IPCC
assessments may be considered a consensual representation of state-of-the-art knowledge in
the fields covered.
The IPCC plenaries, on the other hand, operate under a decision rule of consensus. The 1991
rules of procedure state that, “in taking decisions, drawing conclusions, and adopting reports,
the IPCC Plenary and Working Groups shall use all best endeavours to reach consensus.”
Furthermore, in the 1991 rules of procedure it is stated that, “if consensus is judged by the
relevant body not possible… for conclusions and adoption of reports, differing views shall be
explained and, upon request, recorded.” (“Principles governing IPCC work” from 1991, item
6).
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Thus, in cases where consensus can not be achieved, dissenting views may be recorded in
footnotes to the text. In WG I, however, this has never been necessary. Even in the most
fierce discussions, WG I has largely managed to develop formulations acceptable to all
parties1; government officials as well as scientists.
The lead authors have a major responsibility in the development of the assessments, as well
as in the WG approval of the summaries. They are key players in the selection of contributors
and expert reviewers (and also, on some occasions, in the selection of other lead authors).
Above all, they bear the main responsibility for incorporating into the assessments all
scientifically substantiated viewpoints and findings of the scientific community, as
communicated to them by contributors and reviewers, in a representative and balanced
manner.
While lead authors are selected from lists of nominations by governments, the actual choice
lies with the scientific leadership of the WGs. Scientists not on the nomination list are never
chosen as lead authors, but the IPCC leadership have on some occasions approached govern-
ments to have particular scientists nominated (personal communication with Bert Bolin). The
procedure whereby lead authors are chosen has become increasingly formalised during the
course of the process, but even with the formalisation of procedures in 1993, there are rela-
tively few formal requirements guiding the choice. It is, however, emphasised that due consi-
deration is given to scientists “known through their publication or work”. The “technical
ability” of the lead author and their “ability to work to deadlines” are also emphasised as
important criteria. Finally, it is pointed out that teams of lead authors “should reflect a fair
balance of different points of view”.
The institutional set-up of the IPCC, and particularly the capacity of institutional
arrangements to balance and combine scientific autonomy with policy involvement, seems to
have contributed substantially to the extent to which policy-makers have acknowledged the
scientific authority of the knowledge base and accepted its substantive conclusions as
factually valid. Policy-makers’ confidence in the research results seems to be drawn from at
least two main sources: First, the scholarly competence, integrity and independence of the
scientists involved in the process, and second, the adversarial scrutiny by actors and parties
representing conflicting interests in the policy area. In an area as conflict-prone as climate
change policies, the latter mechanism seems at least as crucial as the first.
                                                  
1 There are some footnotes of dissent in the Synthesis report.
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3 On climate change
3.1 Remembrance of things past: On past climate change
With this background on the estab-
lishment and organisational set up
of IPCC, we now turn to the issue at
hand, namely climate change.
Since its creation 4.6 billion years
ago, the Earth has gone through
large changes. Continents have
been born and reformed, the solar
output has increased some 30 per-
cent, and the atmospheric composi-
tion has changed dramatically.
Given these changes, it is a near
miracle that life has evolved and
still remains on this planet.
The main causes of global climate
change are usually enumerated as
follows:
· Variations in solar radiation
· Variations in the Earth’s
orbit
· The shape and position of
the continents
· Volcanic eruptions
· Variations in the reflections
from the Earth’s surface and
atmosphere (albedo)
· Changes in the composition
of the Earth’s atmosphere:
- gasses
- aerosols
- cloud cover
These driving forces operate on a
number of time scales, from the
very long geological time scale to a
more ‘human’ short time scale.
Concerning the long time scale we
note that over the lifetime of the
Earth one believes that it has experienced four so-called ‘ice houses’; extended cold periods
where ice ages has come and gone. Currently we are in such an ‘ice house’ which started
Some highlights from the history of the
Earth
Time (thousand years ago)
 4 600 000 The creation
 3 300 000 First life
    680 000 First animal
    470 000 First fish
    412 000 First plant
    330 000 First tropical forest
    215 000 First dinosaur
    140 000 First bird
      65 000 Dinosaurs die out
        2 300 First homo
           100 First homo sapiens
             40 Eurasia invaded by homo
                  sapiens
             15 Cave paintings in France and
                  Spain
             10 The end of the last ice age
               8 First civilization
               4 First cities
Adapted from C. Boyle (ed.)(1991): The Human
Dawn, Time-Life Books B.V., Amsterdam.
Figure 5: Ice ages over the last 750,000 years
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some 1.6 million years ago (the
Pleistocene Epoch) and we have so far
experiences some 40 ice ages during
this period, see figure 5 for a record of
ice ages over the last 750,000 years.
The most recent ice age ended some
10,000 years ago.
To put these time scales into perspec-
tive one can note some other memo-
rable moments in the Earth’s develop-
ment (see above).
Homo sapiens are thought to have first
appeared about 400,000 years ago, cer-
tainly in Africa and perhaps in parts of
Asia as well. Anatomically modern
humans appeared in Africa and pos-
sibly in Asia perhaps 100,000 years
ago and eventually arrived in Europe.
Whether they supplanted or absorbed
Neanderthal populations is not clear.
Among these European peoples, the
best known is the Cro-Magnons. Their
populations expanded rapidly
throughout Europe, and their level of
material culture became increasingly
more complex and sophisticated. The
emergence of fully modern humans in
other parts of the world is less
understood, though it seems to have
occurred 30,000-15,000 years ago and involved various migrations and the intermingling of
different populations2.
After the end of the last ice age the climate not only became generally warmer, but also in an
important way more stable. There is increasing evidence that not only during cold periods
with extended glaciation, but also in the previous warmer inter-glacial periods, the climate
was characterised by large variability on a short (decadal) time scale. Only after the last ice
age seems the climate to some extent to have quieted down.
It is noteworthy that agriculture only emerged ca. 7,000 – 8,000 years ago, ie. a couple of
thousand years after the end of the last ice age and only after a quieter climatic period started.
This event, or the establishment of cities some thousands of years later, can perhaps be said to
represent the start of the civilisation as we know it. Thus, our civilisation has only known our
present calm and stable climate.
                                                  
2 See "human evolution" in Britannica Online: http://www.eb.com:180/cgi-bin/g?DocF=micro/281/28.html
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Figure 6: CO2 and CH4 concentration and
temperature over the last 200,000 years together
with current and expected CO2 concentration
levels in the atmosphere
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In this context it is useful to take a look at a graph (figure 6) showing temperature and CO2
levels in the atmosphere since the next but last ice age. The figure gives a vivid picture of the
rate of change we are currently imposing on the atmospheric composition. Already, the CO2
concentration is far above anything we have experienced over the last 200,000 years. The
near vertical increase in CO2 concentration also gives an indication of the unprecedented rate
of change we now impose on the climate system.
The concentration of
methane (CH4) has
increased even more;
145% since pre-in-
dustrial time. Taken
together with the in-
creasing acknow-
ledgement of the
potential instability
of the climate sys-
tem, also in warm
inter-glacial stages,
the picture provides
an important piece of
motivation for the
work undertaken
within the IPCC
system.
Finally, figure 7
shows the impact on climate change (through changes in radiative forcing) of some important
atmospheric greenhouse gases emitted by human activities.
3.2 The present
Returning to the opening statement from the Second assessment report of IPCC that “The
balance of evidence, …  suggests a discernible human influence on global climate”, it is a fact
that the statement drew a lot of criticism. This was partly due to the difficulties encountered
when interpreting the current signals on climate change3. Although the wording of IPCC is
very cautious, it remains debatable whether we in fact today observe ‘a discernible human
influence’. What is not in doubt however, barring very large surprises, is that we in the future
will see such influence on the global climate. Thus, the debate of the above statement is in a
sense spurious and related only to a specific and rather short period of time.
                                                  
3 Special interest groups opposing the whole notion of human induced climate change also made much out of a
procedural error during the editing of one of the chapters. This controversy was however inconsequential with
respect to the factual content of the chapter.
Figure 7 Radiative forcing from atmospheric constituencies
Source: Skodvin and Fuglestvedt (1997)
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3.3 Things to come: On future climate change
IPCC has compiled a set of more or less likely emission scenarios based on various
assumptions regarding population growth, economic development and technological
progress. The implications of these scenarios on some global climate indicators have then
been worked out, see figure 8.
Figure 8: IPCC scenarios
Based on analyses like these, the IPCC warns that we during the next century may face an
(additional) increase in mean global temperature of between 1 and 3.5 degrees Celsius and a
sea level rise of between 15 and 95 cm. However, these global indicators do not tell us much
about the regional and local effects of climate change. Some of the more significant concerns
are:
· precipitation is thought to increase under generally warmer conditions, and the distribu-
tion of precipitation is probably going to be more extreme in that dry places will get drier
while wet places will get wetter,
· during winter, the warming will be more pronounced over land than over oceans,
· warming will be strongest in the north at high latitudes,
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· more days with extreme heat and fewer days with extreme cold are expected.
It is therefore still too early to say precisely where these changes will take place. The task of
determining the likely regional distribution of a global climate change is a main challenge for
IPCC.
3.4 Concluding remarks: On the nature of the climate problem
The problem of climate change is not mainly a problem of increased global average
temperature and precipitation. The seriousness of the problem is more related to the potential
variability and instability of the global climate and the local weather. We now know that the
climate system in the past has shown great and rapid fluctuations due to natural causes. The
stable climate regime observed after the last ice age is currently perturbed by the large
outpouring of greenhouse gases due to human activities of many kinds.
The question then is whether the stability of the current climate regime is able to withstand
this kind of disturbance. At present, we really do not know the answer to this. Furthermore, if
the climate system becomes more unstable, it is very difficult to predict the local and even
regional consequences with any precision. Thus, the problem of climate change is riddled
with uncertainties, and the main challenge for human kind in this situation is to devise a
rational response to this uncertainty. Certainly we should be willing to pay some form of
insurance premium in order to reduce the risk of damaging climate change, but how high a
premium? And how much of the premium should be in the form of greenhouse gas emission
reductions and how much in the form of investments in better defence against a more
unstable climate?
IPCC’s work is important in allowing us to get the best possible scientific foundation for
answering these questions. However, providing an academic answer is one thing, to develop a
politically feasible strategy is quite another. The merging of the scientific consensus and the
political realities is therefore necessary, and the processes in the plenary sessions of IPCC are
important steps in the direction of providing practical answers to the challenge of climate
change.
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Appendix
Composition of the IPCC bureau
The Chairman of the IPCC Bureau is elected as a person, not as a state (e.g., Dr. Robert
Watson is elected, not the United States). All other members are elected as states; the states
then name the individuals (and their successors in the case that they leave). The Vice-Chairs
serve as Co-Chairs of the Working Group Subgroups. IPCC requests that the individuals
named be experts in the relevant fields.
The composition of the IPCC Bureau:
Chairman: Robert T. Watson
Vice-Chair: Japan - Katsuo Seiki
Vice-Chair: Kenya - Richard Odingo
Vice-Chair: India - Rajendra Pachauri
Vice-Chair: Brazil - Gylvan Meira Filho
Vice-Chair: Russian Federation - Yuri A. Izrael
Co-Chair of Working Group I: China - Ding Yihui
Co-Chair of Working Group I: United Kingdom - Sir John Houghton
Vice-Chair of Working Group I: Tanzania - Buruhani Nyenzi
Vice-Chair of Working Group I: Kuwait - Hassan Nasrallah
Vice-Chair of Working Group I: Venezuela - Armando Ramirez
Vice-Chair of Working Group I: Canada - John Stone
Vice-Chair of Working Group I: Australia - John Zillman
Vice-Chair of Working Group I: Switzerland - Fortunat Joos
Co-Chair of Working Group II: Argentina - Osvaldo Canziani
Co-Chair of Working Group II: United States of America - James McCarthy
Vice-Chair of Working Group II: Senegal - Alioune Ndiaye
Vice-Chair of Working Group II: Maldives- Abdullahi Majeed
Vice-Chair of Working Group II: Tunisia - Skander Ben Abdallah
Vice-Chair of Working Group II: Czech Republic - Jan Pretel
Vice-Chair of Working Group II: New Zealand - Martin Manning
Vice-Chair of Working Group II: France - Michel Petit
Co-Chair of Working Group III: The Netherlands - Bert Metz
Co-Chair of Working Group III: Sierra Leone - Ogunlade Davidson
Vice-Chair of Working Group III: Germany - Eberhard Jochem
Vice-Chair of Working Group III: Sri Lanka - Mohan Munasinghe
Vice-Chair of Working Group III: Peru - Eduardo Calvo
Vice-Chair of Working Group III: Cuba - Ramon P. Madruga
Vice-Chair of Working Group III: Indonesia - R.T.M. Sutamihardja
Vice-Chair of Working Group III: Norway - Lorents Lorentsen
In addition, there are Regional Representatives as follows:
IPCC Region I (Africa): Nigeria - Dr. A.Y. Salahu
IPCC Region II (Asia): Kuwait - A.H. Nasrallah
IPCC Region III (South America): Colombia - Dr. K. Robertson
IPCC Region IV (North and Central America and the Caribbean): Cuba - Dr. F. Moros
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IPCC Region V (Southwest Pacific and Small Islands): Australia - Dr. J. Zillman
IPCC Region VI (Europe): Spain - Dr. M. Bautista Perez
Note: The Regional Representatives are usually unanimously nominated by the government
representatives from the respective regions.
The current Bureau was elected unanimously by the IPCC. (Source: http://www.ipcc.ch)
Selected reports from IPCC
Special reports
· The Regional Impacts of Climate Change: An Assessment of Vulnerability. 1998.
Editors: R.T. Watson, M.C. Zinyowera, and R.H. Moss. A Special Report by IPCC
Working Group II.
Summary for Policymakers (SPM)
Technical papers
· Technical Paper I: Technologies, Policies, and Measures for Mitigating Climate Change.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Working Group II. November 1996.
· Technical Paper II: An Introduction to Simple Climate Models Used in the IPCC Second
Assessment Report. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Working Group I.
February 1997.
· Technical Paper III: Stabilization of Atmospheric Greenhouse Gases: Physical, Biological
and Socio-Economic Implications. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Working
Group I. February 1997.
· Technical Paper IV: Implications of Proposed CO2 Emissions Limitations.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Working Group I. October 1997.
Reports
· Climate Change 1995: The Science of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group I
to the Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
· Climate Change 1995: Impacts, Adaptations and Mitigation of Climate Change:
Scientific-Technical Analyses. Contribution of Working Group II to the Second
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
· Climate Change 1995: Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change.
Contribution of Working Group III to the Second Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
· Climate Change 1994: Radiative Forcing of Climate Change (includes a Summary for
Policymakers) and an Evaluation of the IPCC IS92 Emission Scenarios (includes a
Summary for Policymakers and a Technical Summary).
· Preparing to Meet the Coastal Challenges of the 21st Century, Conference Report of the
World Coast Conference, 1993.
· Climate Change 1992: The Supplementary Report to the IPCC Scientific Assessment.
Report of the IPCC Scientific Assessment Working Group (Working Group I).
· Climate Change 1992: The Supplementary Report to the IPCC Impacts Assessment.
Report of the IPCC Impacts Assessment Working Group (Working Group II).
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· Global Climate Change and the Rising Challenge of the Sea: Report of the Coastal Zone
Management Subgroup of the IPCC Response Strategies Working Group (Working
Group III), 1992.
· Proceedings of a Workshop on Assessing Technologies and Management Systems for
Agriculture and Forestry in Relation to Global Climate Change, Canberra, 1992.
· Report of the IPCC Country Studies Workshop, Berkeley, CA, 1992.
· Climate Change: The IPCC 1990 and 1992 Assessments - IPCC First Assessment Report
Overview and Policymaker Summaries, and 1992 IPCC Supplement.
· Climate Change: The IPCC Scientific Assessment, 1990. Report of the IPCC Scientific
Assessment Working Group (Working Group I).
· Climate Change: The IPCC Impacts Assessment, 1990. Report of the IPCC Impacts
Assessment Working Group (Working Group II).
· Climate Change: The IPCC Response Strategies, 1990. Report of the IPCC Response
Strategies Working Group (Working Group III).
· Emission Scenarios: Prepared for IPCC Response Strategies Working Group (Working
Group III), 1990.
· Observed Climate Variations and Change: Contribution in Support of Section 7 of the
1990 IPCC Scientific Assessment, 1990.
· Report of the Energy and Industry Subgroup of the IPCC Response Strategies Working
Group (Working Group III), 1990 (prepared for IPCC).
· Strategies for Adapation to Sea Level Rise: Report of the Coastal Zone Management
Subgroup of the IPCC Response Strategies Working Group (Working Group III), 1990.
· Adaptive Options and Policy Implications of Sea Level Rise and Other Coastal Impacts
of Global Climate Change: Report of the Coastal Zone Management Subgroup of the
IPCC Response Strategies Working Group (Working Group III), 1989.
· Climate Change Impacts Studies Database (Prepared for IPCC).
Methodologies
· IPCC Technical Guidelines for Assessing Climate Change Impacts and Adaptations, 1994
(includes a Summary for Policymakers and an Executive Summary).
· Carbon Balance of World Forested Ecosystems: Toward a Global Assessment.
· IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories (3 volumes), 1994.
· Preliminary Guidelines for Assessing Impacts of Climate Change, IPCC Working Group
II, 1992.
· Assessment of the Vulnerability of Coastal Areas to Sea Level Rise - A Common
Methodology. Report of the Coastal Zone Management Subgroup of IPCC Working
Group III, 1991.
[See also: Annex C in Global Climate Change and the Rising Challenge of the Sea:
Report of the Coastal Zone Management Subgroup of the IPCC Response Strategies
Working Group (Working Group III), 1992.]
· Compilation of References to the Spectroscopic Database for Greenhouse Gases:
Prepared for IPCC Working Group I by Nicole Husson, France, 1991.
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